This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature on policy experiments. First, we demonstrate the usefulness of models as tools with which to draw policy implications from small-scale social experiments. Second, we illustrate the usefulness of social experiments as tools to evaluate models. We apply our methodology to the study of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), an experiment providing generous financial incentives to exit Income Assistance (IA) and obtain stable employment. We first calibrate our model to data on the control group and simulate the experiment within the model. The model predictions match the IA-to-work transition of the treatment group, providing support for our model in this context. We then use the model to undertake an equilibrium evaluation of the SSP. Our results highlight several important feedback effects of the policy change. Together, the feedback effects completely reverse the cost-benefit conclusions implied by the partial equilibrium experimental evaluation.
Introduction
Many potential policies have been evaluated using social experiments, where small subsets of the population are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, the treatment group is subjected to the potential policy reform and the difference in outcomes between the groups provides an estimate of the mean impact of the policy. The resulting treatment effects literature provides useful estimates of the effect of treatment on those individuals participating in the program within an experiment, where typically a small number of individuals are affected by the policy. However, such estimates may be of limited usefulness if the policy evaluated in the experiment is implemented in general. A growing body of research indicates that a policy may have very different implications when it is implemented for the general population than when it is implemented on only a small number of participants for evaluation purposes.
As outlined in Calmfors (1994) and elsewhere, such general equilibrium effects of programs represent a critical component of social cost benefit analysis. Consider two examples of such effects. First, programs may have indirect effects on both participants and nonparticipants by changing the equilibrium of the labor market. These effects violate the "stable unit treatment value" (SUTVA) assumption invoked to justify partial equilibrium analysis. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) consider increasing subsidies to college tuition and find that the resulting increase in the number of individuals who attend college has the effect of increasing the supply of college graduates and reducing their wages. In this case, the effect of the tuition policy depends on the number of college graduates in the labor market.
Second, programs may directly affect those who are not treated within the program. As discussed by Heckman and Smith (1998) , the standard treatment effects literature assumes that the outcomes for individuals not treated by the program within an experiment are the same as the outcomes non-participants would experience if the program is implemented more widely. This need not be the case. For example, consider the US Unemployment Insurance Bonus experiments, where individuals starting a spell of unemployment were offered a cash payment if they obtained employment within a limited time period. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate the displacement effects of the bonus program that would result from changes in the search behavior of all workers in the labor market. In particular, the bonus increases the gain to employment for workers eligible to receive it, resulting in increased search effort and employment. Some of the increase in employment will be in jobs that may otherwise have been held by workers not eligible for the bonus. This displacement directly affects a subset of the labor force not treated within the program.
Existing studies, such as those mentioned above, indicate that the equilibrium effects of large-scale policies may be substantial. With regard to the college tuition subsidies studied by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), they estimate that the general equilibrium effects on enrollment rates are 10 times smaller than those obtained from a partial equilibrium analysis. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that the displacement of UI-ineligible workers offsets 30-60 percent of the gross employment effect of the bonus program. In recent work, Blundell, Costa Dias, and Meghir (2003) consider the long-run effects of a large-scale wage subsidy policy for low-skilled workers. They find that the general equilibrium effects of the policy on unemployment are opposite in sign to the predictions of a partial equilibrium analysis. This has a strong effect on the estimated net impact of the program from society's point of view. As a result, general equilibrium program evaluations can lead to very different conclusions regarding the cost-benefit performance of a program.
Studying the potential general equilibrium effects that may result from implementing a small-scale social experiment as a large-scale policy is difficult without the use of an equi-librium model. However, the degree of confidence that can be placed on policy experiments generated within a model depends to a large extent on how well the model captures the behavior of individuals affected by the policy.
The goal of our paper is to combine the advantages of the literature that attempts to evaluate potential policies through social experiments with the literature that evaluates potential policies through model experiments. We construct a dynamic, equilibrium model that is well-suited for conducting labor market policy experiments and we use the model as a tool for evaluating social programs. Our model is based on the search model of Davidson and Woodbury (1993) . Within the model, the amount of time required to find a job can be reduced by increased search effort on the part of the worker. Once workers and firms meet, they bargain over wages in an environment where wages reflect the value of the match and the value of the outside options faced by both parties. This framework is ideally suited for many equilibrium program evaluations, as it explicitly considers the effect of changes in financial incentives introduced by social programs on the intensity with which individuals search for jobs and on the process by which wages are determined in the labor market.
In addition to the matching and wage determination process, our model incorporates key features of the Income Assistance and unemployment insurance programs, both of which constitute important aspects of the economic context and are likely to have important feedback effects on the labor market.
We then demonstrate the usefulness of social experiments as tools to evaluate equilibrium models. In this respect, our paper serves as an analogue to work by Lalonde (1986) and others, where experiments are used as a benchmark against which to assess the performance of non-experimental estimators. In particular, we consider, as a test of the model, the ability of a model fit to a control group to match the treatment group as an informal test of the model.
In general, calibrated models are tested to the extent to which they can replicate features of the economy. Our exercise is more stringent in the sense that the model must also be able to match the behavior observed in the data following a policy change without exploiting the variation introduced by the policy change itself. We are able to replicate the outcomes produced by a social experiment without the use of experimental data. The ability of the model to do so greatly increases our confidence in the results from our general equilibrium program evaluation. In parallel work, Todd and Wolpin (2003) use the data from the experimental evaluation of Mexico's PROGRESA program to test a structural, dynamic model of fertility and child schooling using a similar approach. In contrast to our paper, the model of Todd and Wolpin is a partial equilibrium model and thus is not able to capture the potential feedback effects of a wide-scale policy change.
As an illustration, we apply our methodology to the equilibrium evaluation of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), a policy designed to provide incentives for individuals on Income Assistance (IA) to leave the system and seek employment. 1 The SSP provides financial incentives by offering temporary earnings supplements to individuals on IA. Individuals must remain on IA twelve months to become eligible for income supplements; once they do, they receive a supplement if they obtain employment and leave Income Assistance within the following twelve months. The model is augmented to incorporate the main features of the SSP. In particular, the model allows for time limits in determining eligibility for receipt of the supplement, consistent with the one-year time limit in the experiment, allows individuals to receive the earnings supplement for up to three years while employed, and allows the earnings supplement to depend on the wages received by eligible recipients. The 1 A growing literature has begun to look at various aspects of the Self-Sufficiency Project (Card and Hyslop, 2002; Ferrall, 2000; Kamionka and Lacroix, 2002 time limitations for entry to and exit from the Canadian unemployment insurance program (Employment Insurance) and the interactions between IA, the unemployment program, and the labor market are also incorporated in the model, including the role of minimum wages.
After constructing the model, we adopt the following strategy. First, we calibrate the equilibrium model in the absence of the program using publicly available, non-experimental data and data on the experimental control group. The parameters calibrated in the first stage include the discount rate, search friction parameters, and exogenous job separation rates: parameters that are, in theory, invariant to changes in the Income Assistance program.
The second stage entails simulating the SSP experiment within our calibrated model using the parameters obtained in the first stage. Simulated program and control groups are constructed and the Self-Sufficiency project is imposed in partial equilibrium to determine how well the model simulations are able to replicate the labor market outcomes of the treatment group in the SSP experimental data. Results from this exercise lend much support to our parsimonious model, as the simulated experimental outcomes match the experimental data quite closely. In particular, the IA-to-work transition rates for the simulated treatment group during the 36 months following random assignment are the same as in the experimental data. Furthermore, we are able to match the delayed-exit effects of a second randomized experiment that offered SSP to new Income Assistance recipients. Finally, we incorporate the features of the SSP in the model, calibrate the model using the parameters obtained in the first stage and simulate the equilibrium effects that result from introducing the SSP as a general policy. This last stage allows us to quantify the displacement, wage and entry effects of the SSP and provides a more complete picture of the potential implications of implementing the SSP as policy.
Three main results emerge from the equilibrium program evaluation. First, introducing an earnings supplement to the Income Assistance program has implications for unemployed workers, as the increase in employment for income assistance recipients coincides with a decrease in re-employment rates for those individuals receiving unemployment benefits. As a result, the overall employment level does not change after the introduction of the policy.
Second, although the introduction of an earnings supplement increases the rate of exits to employment from IA, it does so at lower equilibrium wages, as workers are willing to accept lower starting wages so as to benefit from the supplement payments. Surprisingly, the wages of other workers in the economy increase slightly, as the increased value of IA due to the introduction of the earnings supplement increases the match surplus transferred to the worker. This result is primarily due to the fact that the minimum wage limits the ability of firms to extract the surplus generated by the supplement from the worker.
Finally, the simulation results indicate the presence of entry and delayed exit effects, as the transition rate into the IA program increases and a higher fraction of individuals remain on IA long enough to qualify for the supplement after the policy change. Together, the equilibrium effects reverse the cost-benefit conclusions and further illustrate the importance of equilibrium program evaluation.
The Model
In this section, we present the model of the labor market that we use to conduct equilibrium program evaluations. Three segments of the market are incorporated in the model: individuals may be employed (E), unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits (U ) or on income assistance (A). 2 This feature of the model allows us to consider how workers, unemployed individuals and income assistance recipients interact in the labor market. The model builds on the equilibrium search model of Davidson and Woodbury (1993) , where individuals maximize expected lifetime income by choosing their labor market state and the intensity with which they search for work if not employed. 3 We extend Davidson and Woodbury (1993) to incorporate the Income Assistance program, minimum wages, and time limitations for entry to and exit from the unemployment insurance program. Workers bargain with firms over wages that depend on the tenure of the match, the minimum wage, and on the outside options of both parties. Through this channel, the model generates predictions regarding the way starting wages vary depending on the state from which the individual is entering employment. It is further assumed that the value of the match surplus increases with job tenure, generating on-the-job wage growth in the model. Key features of typical unemployment insurance and income assistance programs are incorporated in the model as follows. 4 First, individuals face time limitations regarding entry to and exit from the unemployment system. Individuals who enter employment from income assistance or who have exhausted their unemployment benefits become eligible to receive unemployment benefits after I months of full time employment. The number of benefit months subsequently increases by one month for each additional month of employment, from a minimum of u months up to a maximum ofū months. Workers who enter employment with unused benefits retain their unused benefit months and accumulate additional months with each month worked. Second, individuals who exhaust their unemployment benefits and do not secure a job are assumed to transit directly to income assistance. Finally, it is assumed that individuals can remain on income assistance indefinitely or transit to employment if they contact a firm with a vacancy; income assistance recipients cannot transit directly from IA to unemployment. In the following sections, we describe the 3 The model of Davidson and Woodbury (1993) is based on work by Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984) . 4 The program details correspond to those in place in Canada at the time of the SSP experiment. Our model could easily be modified to correspond to the institutions present in the US, the UK, or other developed countries.
problems faced by each type of individual and by firms in the model.
Workers
The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and unemployment It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their unemployment benefits expire retain their remaining unemployment benefit eligibility. Finally, workers experience on the job wage growth for a maximum of T months, after which the wage remains constant, where it is assumed T >ū. The value function for a worker with outside option i and with job tenure t is:
where w(t, i) is the wage for a person with tenure t who has unemployment eligibility i, β is the discount rate, V A is the value of being on income assistance, and V U (i) is the value of being unemployed with i benefit periods remaining. 
IA Recipients
where m(0) is the match rate for IA recipients. The only reason IA recipients are not employed is because an employment opportunity is not available and the only way an IA recipient can increase the likelihood of finding a job is through increased search effort. As we will see below the match rate m(0) is determined in part by search effort p(0). 5 
Unemployed Individuals
Unemployed agents receive exogenous unemployment benefits (b u ) and pay search costs
We make the simplifying assumption that unemployment benefits are independent of the individual's pre-separation earnings. With probability m(i), individuals contact a firm with a vacancy and transit to employment in the next month. If individuals remain unemployed in the next month, it is assumed they can continue to collect unemployment benefits until benefits are exhausted. Following the last month of eligibility, individuals can 5 It is worth noting that we assume all income assistance recipients enter employment with tenure 0. This assumption could be relaxed by assuming workers retain their experience when they enter income assistance and allowing experience to depreciate over time. One implication of this extension would be that the hazard of leaving IA would decline as the length of the IA spell increased. The drawback of this extension is that it involves a large increase in the size of the state space. We thank Jim Walker for this valuable suggestion.
either transit to employment, if a job opportunity is available, or transit to IA. The value function for unemployed individuals with i months of benefits remaining is
Firms
Production takes place when there is a match between one firm and one worker; the number of firms can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy. In every period, each firm has the option of filling a vacancy, if one exists, by hiring a worker or
keeping the vacancy open. If matched with a worker, firms earn profits that depend on the surplus generated by the match and pay wages, determined in equilibrium, that depend on the worker's outside options and the minimum wage. Profits depend on the worker's tenure to allow match-specific capital to increase the productivity of the match over time.
Denote the surplus generated by a worker-firm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability δ the match separates and the firm is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote the profits of a firm matched with a worker with outside option i, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., u, ...,ū} and match tenure t as Π(t, i).
The expected discounted present value of profits for matches of job tenure t and workers with outside option i are
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases profits.
If a firm has a vacancy, the value of the vacancy is determined by the probability of meeting an unmatched worker, by the profits the firm expects to make from the match, and by the costs of posting a vacancy (ξ)
where q(i) is the probability a firm matches with a worker with outside option i. Firms will post vacancies unless the expected profit from doing so is negative. Thus in the steady state equilibrium the number of firms in the economy will be determined by the condition that the expected profits from posting a vacancy are zero. Note that this also requires a free entry assumption.
Search Technology
Assume there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability that a jobless individual receives a job offer depends on the probability the worker contacts a firm and the probability a firm has a vacancy.
Workers
The probability a firm has a vacancy is simply the total number of vacancies divided by the total number of firms
If a firm has a vacancy, it will hire a worker and pay a wage which is the outcome of Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm, discussed in detail below. Let applications for jobs arrive according to a Poisson process, where λ is the average number of applications filed by workers at each firm. It is further assumed that firms randomly draw workers from the applicant pool if there is more than one applicant. 6 The probability a worker is offered a job is:
The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on income assistance can then be expressed as the product of the above components, multiplied by the worker's search effort
where
Denote p(0) and p(i) are the contact probabilities for IA recipients and unemployed individuals with i periods of UI receipt remaining, respectively. The contact probabilities are choice variables for the workers within the model and can be interpreted as search effort.
Workers determine the optimal level of search effort by equating the marginal benefit from an increase in search effort with its marginal cost. 7 The optimal level of search effort, for each labor market state and program eligibility combination, is described by:
Firms
From the firm's perspective, the probabilities of meeting potential workers from unemployment and IA are the fraction of workers from unemployment and IA that transit to employment, divided by the total number of vacancies
respectively.
Equilibrium Wage Determination
After meeting in the labor market, a firm and a worker bargain over wages by making alternating wage offers until both sides find the offer acceptable. It is assumed that both parties 
where V i ∈ {V A , V U (i)} is the value of the outside option i. In the following section, we define the steady state conditions that govern the evolution of the economy.
Steady State Conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of vacancies. By definition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total number of occupied jobs and the total number of vacancies
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market L. The total number of individuals can be decomposed into three groups. First the employed, who are distinguished both by their current job tenure and their current outside option
whereĒ is the group of workers no longer experiencing on-the-job wage growth. The second group are on income assistance, denoted A. The final group are unemployed individuals (U ), who can remain unemployed for up to a maximum ofū periods
where U (i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of benefits remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market can therefore be expressed as the sum of the above components
Using the above definitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state, where the flows in and out of every employment state must be equal over time. The steady state conditions for each state and eligibility combination are discussed in turn below.
Employment
As above, let m(0) and m(i) denote the probabilities that IA recipients and unemployment recipients with i periods of benefits remaining, respectively, match with a firm. The flow into the first period of employment includes those workers from IA and unemployment who receive job offers. They are indexed by their respective outside options as this will determine their progression of benefit entitlements. In subsequent periods, the inflow consists of workers who were employed in the previous period and who were not exogenously separated from their jobs
Income Assistance
The flow into Income Assistance includes those employed workers who were exogenously separated from their jobs and ineligible for unemployment benefits and unemployed workers no longer eligible for unemployment benefits. The flow out of IA includes IA recipients who find employment. The steady state condition for IA is the following:
Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the maximum months of unemployment benefits flow into the first period of unemployment, U (ū). For U (i) where 0 < i <ū, the inflow consists of unemployed workers from the previous period who did not find jobs, and workers separated from their jobs who qualify for less than the maximum number of benefit months. All workers flow out of the unemployment state when benefits run out due to the time limitations in the unemployment insurance program
The model presented above is a standard model of the labor market. It contains features common to many unemployment and welfare programs and is a model that is straightforward to extend to study many policy reforms. In the next section, we combine the model with information from a recent social experiment to show how the two can be combined to improve current equilibrium policy evaluations.
Combining Social Experiments and Structural Models for Policy Evaluation
In this section, we describe a way to use social experiments in combination with structural models to conduct equilibrium policy evaluations. The social experiment we consider is the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project. We start by providing some details on the SSP and then outline our approach for conducting an equilibrium policy evaluation of the Self-Sufficiency Project. 8 The Canadian Self-Sufficiency (SSP) experiment focused on long-term IA recipients. 9
The universe for the experiment was long-term single parent IA recipients ages 19 and older in British Columbia and New Brunswick from November 1992 to March 1995. This universe was sampled at random. Of those selected, 6,028 recipients volunteered to participate in the experiment and were subsequently placed in treatment and control groups by random assignment. 10 Individuals assigned to the treatment group were informed that they were to receive an earnings supplement if they found a full-time (30 hours per week) job within one year and left income assistance. The supplement received by members of the treatment group depends on their labor market earnings. 11 In particular, the supplement payment 8 For comprehensive details on the Self-Sufficiency Project, see Michalopoulous, et al. (2002) . 9 In particular, individuals had to receive IA in at least 11 months during the last year including the current month to be included in the experiment. 10 Kamionka and Lacroix (2002) examine the potential for randomization bias in the (partial equilibrium) experimental impact estimates due to refusals to participate in the experiment. They find evidence that the published estimates understate the true impact of the SSP treatment.
11 No other sources of income affected the calculation of the earnings supplement.
equals one-half of the distance between the earnings of the recipient and a benchmark earnings level, set at $37,000 in British Columbia and at $30,000 in New Brunswick. Once eligible, individuals could receive the supplement for up to three years. Individuals in the treatment group who were not able to secure full-time employment within the twelve months following random assignment were not eligible to receive the supplement. Individuals in the control group were not eligible for the supplement.
The data contain information on 5,686 recipients in the main study: 2,827 control group members and 2,859 program group members. From the main study, the following restrictions are placed on the baseline sample. First, 280 males are eliminated from the sample so that our analysis can focus on a homogeneous group (single mothers) within the study. Each step will be discussed in detail below.
Constructing the model control group
In this section, we calibrate the model presented above to data on single mothers without completed post-secondary education and to data on the control group from the experiment.
The model is calibrated for British Columbia and New Brunswick, the two provinces in which the SSP experiment was implemented. For the sake of brevity, we only report results pertaining to British Columbia. A full set of results for New Brunswick is contained in a supplement that is available from the authors upon request. 15 Since the SSP experiment only affected a small fraction of the population we use a partial equilibrium version of the model when comparing the predicted impact to the mean impact in the data. 15 In general, the results for New Brunswick are quite similar to those for British Columbia. The main reason British Columbia was included in the paper as opposed to New Brunswick is that a second component of the SSP, the Entry Effects experiment, was only carried out in British Columbia.
The parameters for the partial equilibrium version of the model include monthly income assistance and unemployment benefits (b a and b u , respectively), the wage profile, the size of the labor force (L), the vacancy rate (V /F ), the job separation rate (δ), the discount factor (β), and the search friction parameters (c a , c u , z) . The values used for these parameters are all reported in Table 2 . The model is homogeneous of degree zero in L and F ; we can therefore normalize the size of the labor force to 100 without loss of generality. The number of firms in the economy will be estimated in the baseline model, and is identified using the observed vacancy rate in the economy. Equation (11) determines V endogenously as a function of F and E. In order to estimate F we use the additional relationship between F and V given by the vacancy
The vacancy rate of 3.20 is taken from Galarneau et al. (2001) and is based on the average 16 The Canadian Labour Force Survey is the analogue of the U.S. Current Population Survey. 17 All figures are reported in Canadian dollars, where $1Cdn is approximately equal to $0.63US.
for the retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing sectors, both of which have average incomes similar to our sample. Therefore, using equation (11), and for a given value of E,
The job separation rate in the model (δ) is constant and can be directly estimated by the average job tenure for single mothers with no completed post-secondary education in the monthly Labour Force Survey (1990 Survey ( -2000 . Job tenure is only reported for individuals currently employed in the data: we do not have direct information on separations. However, average job tenure is observed and in the model is equal to
Average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (LFS 1990 (LFS -2000 for this group is 46.68 months; therefore the separation rate is equal to 0.0214. 18 We use parameter estimates for our search cost function from Christensen, Lentz,
Mortensen, Neumann and Wervatz (2002), whose estimates of the elasticity of search costs imply z = 1.8457, and we set the monthly discount factor β equal to 0.9835, corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.82 as in Davidson and Woodbury (1993) . We assess the sensitivity of our results to these parameters in Section 6 below. The costs of search are allowed to differ depending on whether individuals are receiving unemployment insurance or Income Assistance to capture the notion that searching may be less costly while unemployed. For example, unemployed individuals may have access to better search technologies through unemployment offices than do IA recipients, which would be consistent with c a > c u .
To identify the search friction parameter c a we use the income assistance to work tran-sition rate, m(0), directly observed from the SSP control group. The data on the control group does not provide information on the transition from unemployment to work necessary to identify the search friction for this group (c u ). Instead we use the search friction implied by the equilibrium model calibrated to the low skilled labor force outlined below in Section 4.
Next we must specify the length of time a worker is eligible for unemployment benefits.
The length of the unemployment eligibility period in Canada depends on the unemployment rate in the region of residence and on the worker's previous job tenure. We set the eligibility periods in the model according to the eligibility rules during the 1990s. This implies that a worker is entitled to 5 months of benefits after working 4 months, and to 10 months of benefits after working 9 months or more (Lin 1998 ).
Finally, we calibrate the minimum wage, as the minimum wage serves as a constraint on the wage bargaining process in the model. We set the minimum wage to 5.50 to match the legislated minimum wage at the beginning of the SSP experiment. We use the minimum wage that was in place at the beginning of the SSP experiment (Michalopoulos et al.,
2002
) and abstract from increases in the minimum wage over the remaining course of the experiment. 19 
Constructing the model treatment group
The following additions are made to the model to incorporate the Self-Sufficiency Project. 20 First, individuals on IA face several time constraints. IA recipients become eligible for SSP after they have been on income assistance a minimum of 12 months. Once eligible for SSP, individuals have 12 months to find full-time employment in order to receive supplement 19 As discussed in Michalopoulos et al. (2002) , the minimum wage increased several times following random assignment, from $5.50 per hour in November 1992 to $7.15 by April 1998. We repeated our analysis using the minimum wage in place at the end of the experiment and found the qualitative results were the same. Results are available from the authors upon request. 20 The model changes required to introduce the SSP in the model are minor. Full details on the augmented model are therefore excluded from the paper, but available from the authors upon request. One goal of the SSP is to provide workers with enough time to experience sufficient wage growth so that employment remains an attractive alternative once the earnings supplement expires. On-the-job wage growth, which results from increases in the surplus created in worker-firm matches in our model, captures this particular feature of the program.
Comparing the outcomes of the model experiment with the outcomes of the social experiment
We now compare the predicted partial equilibrium effects of SSP to those found in the SSP experiment. This comparison represents an empirical test of our model, in the same spirit as the comparisons of experimental and non-experimental partial equilibrium estimates in LaLonde (1986) and other, similar papers in the treatment effects literature. It is important to emphasize that we do not use any information on the SSP treatment group in the calibration of our model; we are interested in whether the model can predict the behavior of the treatment group as an informal out of sample test.
In order to mimic the experimental design of the SSP, the model is simulated in partial equilibrium, using a fixed wage profile, to obtain the conditional re-employment probabilities. After calibrating and simulating the model, we select those individuals who received income assistance benefits for 12 months. The re-employment probabilities from this simulated sample represent the simulated control group. We then use the estimated parameters and solve for the re-employment probabilities for an individual on IA who is offered the SSP supplement. Again, this is done in partial equilibrium, implying any change in behavior will not have an impact on any other individuals, or on the wage distribution. The reemployment probabilities in this instance represent the treatment group in our simulation. As an additional test of how well the model predicts behavior we reproduce a second experiment designed to estimate the delayed-exit from income assistance that may result from the 12 month qualification period. The delayed-exit experiment was a separate experiment conducted on a sample of 3,315 single parents in their first month of Income Assistance receipt in the metropolitan area of Vancouver, British Columbia. This sample was randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, where the treatment group was told that 21 To maintain comparability between our model and the experimental data we condition on not being employed full-time in the month of random assignment and consider exits to full-time employment as the end of an income assistance spell. In the model, receiving income assistance and employment are mutually exclusive states, while in the data they are not. This is due to lags in the receipt of income assistance payments, as well as the definition of full-time employment in the SSP data: "being employed full-time during any portion of the month." Conditioning on not being employed at random assignment gives us an appropriate group for comparison with the model at the expense of dropping the 25 percent who were employed. The model is thus able to predict the magnitude of the experimental delayed-exit effect quite well.
Comparing the model predictions with the experimental impacts we can see that the model correctly predicts both the degree of delayed exit associated with the expectation of receiving the SSP benefit in the future (the entry effect) as well as the increased transition rate into employment that becoming eligible for the SSP program induces. This comparison indicates that the model captures the fundamental dynamics introduced by the SSP supplement, which increases our confidence in the policy experiments that follow. 4 Step 4: The Equilibrium Impacts of the SSP Policy
Calibrating the equilibrium model
In the equilibrium analysis, we focus on all IA recipients. We do this for two reasons. First, it simplifies our analysis substantially. If the SSP were limited to single mothers, the model would have to be extended to allow for two types of IA recipients: single mothers and all other IA recipients. This extension would require a large increase in the size of the state space. Second, if the SSP policy were adopted, it would likely apply to all IA recipients rather than just to single parents, both for political reasons related to equal treatment and to avoid incentive effects of SSP on marital dissolution and on out-of-wedlock childbearing.
For the equilibrium version of the model we need to additionally calibrate the parameters for firm behavior, equilibrium wage determination, as well as impose the steady state conditions. Additionally, since the relevant group to be studied within the model is no longer limited to single mothers, we recalibrate wages, unemployment benefits, and IA benefits to the segment of the labor market that has less than a post-secondary level of education to reflect the low-skilled labor market most likely to be affected by the policy. The values of all the calibrated parameters are presented in Table 3 and discussed in detail below.
The calibrated IA benefits are equal to $695 in British Columbia. 22 The resulting monthly unemployment benefits level is $1, 174.
The labor force states (A, U , and E) are estimated from the 1993-94 longitudinal wave of the Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (SLID). 23 Unlike the LFS, the SLID has separate data on Income Assistance and unemployment benefit receipt. We adopt the following definitions in the data to maintain consistency with the model. We define employed workers as individuals who are employed in the first week of the month and report no unemployment or IA income during the month. Unemployed workers are defined as individuals who are either unemployed or not in the labor force and report receiving unemployment benefits.
Finally, IA recipients are individuals who are either unemployed or not in the labor force and report receiving Income Assistance benefits. We exclude all individuals who do not fit these criteria, such as those who report working full time and receiving either unemployment benefits or Income Assistance. Similarly, we exclude those reporting they are unemployed or not in the labor force, but not receiving any unemployment or Income Assistance benefits. 24 In addition, we calibrate the match surplus for each of the first 48 months of job tenure (S(1)-S(48)), with one additional match surplus for all jobs of a longer duration (S(49)).
The match values for different match tenure levels are calibrated as follows. We do not directly observe the match surplus; however, we do observe the average wage for workers with different tenure levels in the data. We can therefore use the wage and tenure information from the LFS for the sample of individuals without completed post-secondary education to infer the match values in the baseline economy. In particular, we estimate a wage profile that is cubic in job tenure and determine what match values in the model generate the equilibrium wage profile in the data. It is important to emphasize that we assume the match values S(t), but not wages, are invariant to policy changes. In particular, the policy changes we consider change the value of the outside options of workers and firms, and thus the way the match value is divided, but not the total value of the match itself. 25 The first periods of employment in the model differ from later periods of employment, as the model allows starting wages to differ depending on whether the worker's outside option is IA or unemployment. However, it is not possible to separate out the starting wages in the data for individuals with different outside options. In the model, all matches are assumed to have the same match surplus value, but workers may receive different wages, as they face different outside options when bargaining with firms. Therefore, when estimating the starting wages for workers in each of the firstū periods of employment, we restrict the average of the wage for each month in the model to equal the average wage for a worker with the corresponding tenure in the data. The cost of posting a vacancy (ξ) is calibrated so that the value of a vacancy is equal to zero. The job separation rate (δ), as well as the elasticity of search cost (z), and the discount factor (β) are calibrated as in Section 3.1. 
The Displacement Effect
The expected durations of joblessness are presented in the top half of Table 4 essence, serves to increase the likelihood an unemployed worker exhausts their benefits and transits to IA, as unemployed workers are displaced in the labor market by IA recipients.
The total jobless duration increases for those who begin a spell in unemployment, while the total jobless duration decreases for those exiting employment to IA.
The last three rows of Table 4 suggests that the fraction of contacts the firm makes with SSP eligible workers is 3.7% in British Columbia. As a result, employment rates and vacancies decline in British Columbia following the introduction of SSP.
The Wage Effect
As discussed in Section 3, starting wages differ depending on whether the worker transits from Income Assistance or unemployment and depending on the length of the unemployment spell. Once the Self-Sufficiency policy is in place, starting wages also differ depending on whether the worker is transiting from an SSP-eligible state. Table 5 displays the average earnings, over the first three months of employment, for workers transiting to employment from selected states. Several patterns are worth discussion.
First, individuals eligible to receive supplement payments in British Columbia experience a 5% reduction in wages. The reason supplement-eligible workers do not experience large reductions in wages, if any, is due to the fact that firms are constrained to pay them at least the minimum wage. The income of workers receiving supplement payments, as a result, rises substantially: for example, before the policy change an individual in British Columbia that transited to employment from the first period of IA would earn, on average, $938 per month over the first three months of employment. In contrast, the same worker would expect to receive $1, 989 in earnings and supplement payments if she transits to employment during the first month she is eligible to receive supplement payments following the policy change. Surprisingly, other workers experience an increase in wages following the introduction of the Self-Sufficiency policy. For example, unemployment recipients who are one month from exhausting benefits receive starting wages that are 13% higher after the introduction of the SSP program. One's initial intuition may be that they should receive a lower wage; the reason they do not is because supplement-eligible workers do not experience a large decline in wages because of the minimum wage. As a result, the introduction of the supplement does not result in firms receiving a larger share of the match surplus. Firms can not extract additional surplus out of workers because of the minimum wage. At the same time, the value of entering IA has increased due to the introduction of the supplement. As a result, the outside options of unemployment recipients and IA recipients that are not eligible to receive the supplement improve.
The Entry and Delayed-Exit Effects
As discussed earlier, the equilibrium unemployment rate increases slightly with the introduction of the SSP program, the result of a lower re-employment probability for unemployed workers. The fall in re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers is due in large part to the fact that unemployed workers exert less search effort after the policy change. The difference in search effort for unemployed workers in the baseline and in the model following the introduction of the Self-Sufficiency policy is presented in Figure 2 . In general, search effort for unemployed workers increases in the months leading up to unemployment benefit exhaustion. However, since the value of transiting to IA has increased following the policy change, search effort for unemployed workers in the SSP world does not rise to the same extent as it did in the baseline economy. As a result, a larger fraction of unemployed workers transit from unemployment to IA after the policy change.
The search behavior of IA recipients also changes following the policy change. Figure 3 compares the survival rates for individuals entering Income Assistance in the baseline world and the SSP world. The survival rate is higher in the first 15 months after the policy change than in the base case. This finding is indicative of the presence of entry effects, due to the fact that individuals have incentives to remain on IA long enough to become eligible to receive the supplement. Although survival rates are higher in the first 15 months after the policy change, the subsequent decrease in survival rates that results from the increased search effort of supplement-eligible IA recipients appears to outweigh the entry effects, as the average duration of IA spells declines following the imposition of the SSP.
A Comparison of the Simulated Impacts in Partial Equilibrium and General Equilibrium
To gauge the importance of general equilibrium effects in the simulated economy, we com- Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).
Reconsidering the Costs and Benefits of the Self-Sufficiency Project
In this section, we look at the benefits of implementing the Self-Sufficiency policy relative to the costs. To highlight the importance of equilibrium effects, we conduct our cost-benefit analysis on both the partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium results. Our analysis has two limitations worth noting. First, SSP was found to have both positive and negative effects on other variables of interest such as marriage and child outcomes (Michalopoulos et al., 2002) . We ignore outcome variables other than earnings, as they are beyond the scope of this paper. Second, we do not consider any additional costs or benefits associated with moving from the baseline steady state to the SSP steady state.
We start with the partial equilibrium cost-benefit analysis. In this case, the following assumptions are imposed. First, the only individuals who change their behavior in response to the policy change are those who have been on income assistance for 12 months. Second, any jobs obtained as a result of the SSP program are 'new jobs', leading to an increase in aggregate output. Finally, wages do not change from the baseline economy. In other words, we assume that there are no displacement effects, no entry and delayed exit effects, and no wage effects.
Our cost-benefit analysis, presented in Table 6 Third, we calculate total output in the baseline economy and in the economy under the Self-Sufficiency Project for both provinces. In the partial equilibrium version of the model, the value of monthly output increases after the Self-Sufficiency policy is introduced.
In particular, we predict output to increase, per 1000 in the population, by $2,383,891 in British Columbia after the imposition of the policy change. Finally, we add the direct costs of the program to the additional cost of taxes for the increase in transfers and subtract the gain in the value of output. Under these assumptions the SSP program more than pays for itself; there is a net gain from the program of $1,762,470 per 1000.
The equilibrium effects of the policy change the cost-benefit conclusion drawn from the partial equilibrium analysis substantially. Performing the same calculations using the general equilibrium values for output, Income Assistance, and IA recipiency yields dramatically different cost-benefit estimates: after taking the equilibrium effects into account, the SelfSufficiency policy yields a net cost of $1,982,444 per 1000. These findings highlight the importance of conducting general equilibrium evaluations of programs, rather than relying solely on the findings from partial equilibrium social experiments, to guide policy.
27 See, e.g., Diewert (1988) and Dalhby (1994) for Canada and Browning (1987) for the U.S.
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 present the cost-benefit analysis in the case where the marginal social cost of a tax dollar is zero. This comparison provides a lower bound on the indirect costs of implementing the Self-Sufficiency Project as a wide-scale program. In this instance, the general equilibrium results indicate that the program is still predicted to result in a net loss due to the fall in output after the policy change.
Sensitivity Analysis
Evidence on the extent to which our results are sensitive to the choice of the discount factor (β) and the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort (z) is presented in Table 7 .
It is worth emphasizing that the search friction parameters Table 7 .
First, we consider the sensitivity of our partial equilibrium measure of the estimated impact of SSP on income assistance survival rates. For comparison purposes, we also present the experimental impact constructed from the data. Lowering the discount factor increases the simulated impact of the policy in partial equilibrium. This occurs because lower values of c a and c u associated with the decrease in the discount factor result in a higher exit rate from IA. As search costs become less elastic with respect to search effort, the shape of the cost function changes such that the simulated IA survival rate is greater than the experimental counterpart during the 12 months of supplement eligibility. The consistency of Davidson and Woodbury's (1993) estimate of the discount factor and of the search elasticity parameter estimated by Christensen et al. (2002) with the behavior of participants in the Canadian SSP is quite striking.
Next, we consider the sensitivity of the general equilibrium program evaluation to changes in the parameters outlined above. In general, the predicted labor force composition is relatively insensitive to the changes in parameter estimates, as are the number of firms and vacancies. It is also important to note that the cost benefit conclusions do not change in any of the specifications: the partial equilibrium analysis consistently results in a net gain of the SSP program and the general equilibrium analysis consistently reports a net loss.
Alternative Versions of the Self-Sufficiency Policy
One of the main advantages to the approach taken in this paper is that we are able to explore the implications of changing the program parameters of the Self-Sufficiency Project within our framework. To this end, we consider three alternative versions of the Self-Sufficiency Policy and simulate the predicted outcomes of each policy in general equilibrium. First, we consider changes in the generosity of the earnings supplement for eligible income assistance recipients. In particular, we reduce the earnings ceiling by 25%. Second, we reduce the supplement payment period from 36 months to 12 months. Finally, we require new IA recipients to remain on IA for 24 months, as opposed to 12, to qualify for SSP. Results of each policy experiment are presented in Table 8 .
In general, reducing the size of the supplement payments and reducing the eligibility and supplement payment periods are predicted to improve the cost-benefit performance of SSP without resulting in reductions in employment. This finding is due to a reduction in the entry effect: individuals are less willing to exhaust their unemployment benefits or to remain on IA for longer periods as SSP becomes less generous. Alternatively, restricting the time limits for eligibility and benefit payments results in a reduction in the employment rate for this sector of the economy.
Conclusion
This paper makes two main contributions to the program evaluation literature. The first contribution is methodological: we show how evidence from social experiments can be used in combination with a structural model to perform convincing policy analysis. In particular, we consider the ability of a model, fit to an experimental control group, to match the treatment group as an informal test of the model. We then use the model to study the general equilibrium effects of a policy change, an exercise that cannot be undertaken without the use of a structural model. Together, social experiments and structural models of the labor market and government assistance programs promise to be a powerful tool for program evaluation.
The second contribution of our paper is to illustrate the potential of the model as a tool for policy analysis in our evaluation of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project. We find that equilibrium wages fall for those treated by the program after the introduction of the earnings supplement, as workers are willing to accept lower starting wages so as to benefit from the supplement payments. However, wages of other workers in the economy increase slightly as the existence of the SSP, along with the minimum wage, increases the threat point of workers. Furthermore, the simulation results indicate the presence of entry effects, as a higher fraction of individuals remain on IA to become eligible for the supplement after the policy change. All three effects have important implications for the cost-benefit performance of the policy: the general equilibrium effects completely reverse the cost-benefit calculation. Notes: The sources for the the baseline vales of the labor force, number of firms and vacancy rate are given in Table 3 . All other values are generated by the model. 
